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NOTE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-FEDERAL INDIAN LAWRECENT DEVELOPMENTS-State of Washington,
Department of Ecology v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985)
The Ninth Circuit held that the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act which delegates to states the power to implement and enforce
hazardous waste plans over "persons" within the state does not
extend state power over Indian lands.

INTRODUCTION

For the past decade, the question of jurisdictional authority over environmental protection programs within Indian country' has become increasingly important. 2 Many federal environmental statutes delegate
authority to the individual states to devise and implement environmental
protection programs.' However, it is unclear whether these same statutes
also convey authority to the states over Indian country, an area over which
states generally lack authority. Since many tribes have recently begun
developing the valuable natural resources on their lands, and promoting
economic development in general, the question has taken on great significance. State of Washington, Department of Ecology v. United States
1. "Indian country" is a term of art first defined in 1948 as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rightsof-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982).
This encompasses much more territory than the more commonly used term "Indian reservation,"
which describes only that territory reserved for Indian occupancy by treaty, statute, or executive
order, and does not include Indian communities outside of the reservation. See generally F.S. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, ch. 1 (1982 ed.).
2. Several law review articles published during the last decade discuss this question in detail.
See. e.g., Carter, Regulatory Jurisdiction on Indian Reservations in Montana, 5 PUB. LAND L. REv.
147 (1984); Feldman, The Developing Test for State Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country:
Application in the Context of Environmental Law, 61 OR. L. REv. 561 (1982); Will, Indian Lands
Environment-Who Should Protect It?, 18 NAT. Ras. J. 465 (1978) [Will].

3. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6997 (1984)
[RCRAJ; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982) [CAA]; Clean Water
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1982) [CWA] (previously known as the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1982) [SDWA];
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1978, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982) [FIFRA].
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Environmental ProtectionAgency4 [Washington] is the first case to directly
address this question. 5
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA],6 is a comprehensive federal program for hazardous waste management. The RCRA
delegates authority to the states, in lieu of the federal government, to
develop and implement such programs. 7 According to the RCRA, a state

has enforcement authority over "any person."' Included in the definition

of "person" is "municipality," 9 which in turn includes "an Indian tribe
or authorized tribal organization."'"
Relying on these statutory provisions, the Washington StateDepartment
of Ecology submitted a plan to the Environmental Protection Agency
[EPA] on May 3, 1982, for interim authorization of its existing hazardous
waste program." Washington asserted authority to regulate hazardous
wastes on all lands within the state, including Indian reservations.' 2 The
EPA approved Washington's plan only as it applied to non-Indian lands,

asserting that 1) the RCRA did not confer jurisdiction over Indian land
to the states, and 2) the state had not adequately demonstrated any other
4. 752 F.2d 1465 (9thCir. 1985).
5. Other courts have never dealt with this issue on the merits, but have dismissed several similar
cases on procedural grounds, for example, lack of ripeness. See Will, supra note 2, at 472-73.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6997 (1984).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1984). The state must submit its plan to the EPA to receive authorization
to carry it out. The EPA Administrator shall authorize the plan if the state's proposal is "substantially
equivalent" to the government's requirements. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. §6928(a) (1984). This section actually provides for federal enforcement authority.
However, § 6926(d) provides that state actions under the Act have the same force and authority as
federal actions. Therefore, a state with an approved plan has authority over any person in the state
just as the federal government does in the absence of a state plan.
9. 42 U.S.C. §6903(15) (1984).
10. 42 U.S.C. §6903(13) (A) (1984). The CWA and the SDWA have the same provisions regarding
"person," "'municipality," and Indians. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(4) and (5)(1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f(l0)
and (12) (1982). Interestingly, §300j-6(c)(l) of the SDWA also provides that:
Nothing in the Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977 shall be construed to alter
or affect the status of American Indian lands or water rights nor to waive any sovereignty
over Indian lands guaranteed by treaty or statute.
Washington used this provision to argue by negative implication that the lack of any such provision
in the RCRA showed congressional intent to allow state jurisdiction over Indian lands. The court
rejected this argument as contrary to the well-established principle of Indian law that Indian rights
cannot be abrogated absent an express congressional statement of intent to do so. Washington, 752
F.2d at 1471, n.6.
1I.42 U.S.C. §6926 (1984) provides that any state which had an existing hazardous waste plan
at the time the Act was promulgated in 1976 could apply for temporary authorization to carry it out.
States without existing plans had to wait for the EPA to promulgate guidelines.
12. There are 22 tribes in Washington. In 1974, their land holdings, including tribally owned,
allotted, and non-Indian owned'fee lands, totalled approximately 2,769,000 acres. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND TRUST LANDS 531-575 (1974).
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grounds for extending its jurisdiction over Indian country. 3 Following
special provisions in the RCRA, the state petitioned the Ninth Circuit for
review of the EPA's decision.' 4
A three judge panel unanimously affirmed the EPA's decision. 5 The
court reviewed the RCRA and found that nothing in the Act or its legislative history dealt with the question of jurisdiction over Indian country.
Under the basic principles of federal Indian law, states do not have
jurisdiction within Indian country unless Congress clearly expresses an
intent to allow a state to exercise power. 6 Although the RCRA's definitional provisions concerning "persons" could be read to confer jurisdiction to the states, the court determined that these provisions only serve
to make tribes "regulated entities""' subject to federal authority under
the RCRA, not to state authority. The court held that it must therefore
defer to a reasonable interpretation of the statute by the EPA, RCRA's
administering agency.'" Circuit Judge Canby, writing for the court, determined that the EPA's interpretation was reasonable because 1) the EPA
has a published policy of Indian self-determination in the area of environmental protection of Indian lands; 2) the principles of federal Indian
law generally preclude state authority over Indian country unless Congress
clearly expresses an intent to allow it; 3) the federal trust responsibility
toward Indians is best carried out if regulation of such programs remains
in the federal government's control; and 4) the long tradition of Indian
13. The EPA stated that it denied Washington jurisdiction as to Indian lands because:
EPA assumes a State lacks authority unless the State affirmatively asserts authority

and supports its assertion with an analysis from the State Attorney General.... EPA
has concluded that the State's assertion is not adequately supported in law or by the
analysis provided....

[Ciontrary to the State's argument, EPA concludes that RCRA and the act of authorization do not convey to the State any authority relative to Indian lands jurisdiction.
Rather, States must independently obtain such authority expressly from Congress or
by treaty. The State has not demonstrated such authority and to EPA's knowledge has

not been granted such authority; EPA, therefore, will retain jurisdiction for operating
the Federal program on Indian lands in the State of Washington.
48 Fed. Reg. 34,956-957 (1983). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 33,378 (1980) and 40 C.F.R. § 271.121(h)
[formerly 40 C.F.R. § 123. 121(f)] (1986).
14. 42 U.S.C. §6976(a)(1) (1984) provides for review of final agency regulations only in the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. 42 U.S.C. § 6976(b) (1984) provides for review of agency
actions "issuing, denying, modifying, or revoking any permit ... or in granting, denying, or
withdrawing ... interim authorization" in any appropriate Court of Appeals.
The EPA argued that the Ninth Circuit did not have jurisdiction over this case because it contended
that Washington was seeking review of regulations and not permit actions. However, the court
rejected this argument saying that there had never been any regulations squarely addressing the
question of jurisdiction over Indian lands which Washington could have appealed in accordance
with§ 6976(a)(1). In addition, the case falls under § 6976(b) dealing with interim authorizations. The
court therefore determined that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter. 752 F.2d at 1468.
15. 752 F.2d at 1466.
16. See infra BACKGROUND, at § I.
17. 752 F.2d at 1469.
18. Id.
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sovereignty must be used as a "backdrop" for interpreting ambiguous
federal statutes.' 9
This casenote will discuss the court's decision given existing case law,
the Indian law canons of statutory construction, and the EPA policy upon
which the court relied. It will also discuss the ramifications of this decision
in light of 1) a new EPA Indian Policy2' promulgated while Washington
was pending, and 2) recent congressional amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act,2 the Comprehensiye Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund), 2 and the Clean Water Act.2
BACKGROUND
The precise question of jursidiction over environmental programs in
Indian country posed in this case was one of first impression. However,
the Washington court was aided by precedent in two areas-the authority
of an administrative agency to interpret the statutes it must administer,
and the general principles of federal Indian law.
Power of an Administrative Agency to Interpret Statutes
According to the body of administrative law, an administrative agency
has some power to interpret the statutes entrusted to it. The Washington
court relied in particular on two prior cases dealing with this power. The
first, Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 4 recognized that when a statute is silent or ambiguous with regard to a
particular issue, the administering agency is allowed to "fill in the gaps"
left by Congress.25 The second, Columbia Land Basin ProtectionAgency
v. Schlesinger,6 held that courts should defer to an agency's reasonable
interpretations, even if the agency or the reviewing court could have made
other likewise reasonable interpretations. 27
19. id.at 1469-71.
20. EPA Indian Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations
(Nov. 8, 1984).
21. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-339, 100 Stat. 665, codified at
42 U.S.C. §§300f-300j (1986).
22. Superfund Amendments and Authorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613,
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§9601-57 (1986).
23. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-4, 10! Stat. 7, codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1987).
24. 467 U.S. 837 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1985).

25. 467 U.S. at 842-44.
26. 643 F2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Nance v. Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F2d
701, 714 (9th Cir. 1981) ["Agency interpretations of federal statutes are entitled to great weight.
Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1974). '[The construction of a statute by those charged
with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.' Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 38!.
27. 643 F.2d at 600.
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FederalIndian Law
Four basic principles of federal Indian law have been developed and
used by the courts to analyze questions involving tribal, federal, and state
relations. They are: tribal sovereignty, preemption of state power, the
federal trust responsibility, and the canons of statutory construction. These
principles must be briefly discussed in order to understand the Washington
court's decision.
Tribal Sovereignty: Preemption of State Power as a Protection of
Tribal Sovereignty
In addition to relying on administrative law cases, the court relied
primarily on the principles of federal Indian law developed over the past
150 years. The seminal 1832 decision of Worcester v. Georgia2" laid down
one of the fundamental tenets in Indian law-that Indian tribes retain the
power of self-government. Worcester established that Indian tribes are
sovereign nations whose powers are "not, in general, delegated powers
granted by express acts of Congress, but rather 'inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."' 29
Because Indian tribes are inherently sovereign nations, Worcester held
that states are excluded from exercising jurisdiction over them. Worces28. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) [Worcester].
29. CoHFN, supra note I, at 231, quoted with approval in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 322 (1978) [Wheeler]. The sovereignty of Indian tribes is "limited" because of the holding in
Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) [Johnson]. In an opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall, the Supreme Court held that the conquering European nations, and their successors the
United States, became the fee simple owners of the North American continent. Indians retained the
right to use and occupy their ancestral homes, subject to the right of the United States to purchase
their lands. In effect, both the Indians and the whites "held" the fee, but the ultimate ownership of
the land was vested in the United States.
Tribal sovereignty stems from the Indian tribes' aboriginal, inherent power to govern themselves.
Because of the "discovery and conquest" of the New World, the tribes became subject to the power
of the European and later the United States government. Johnson stripped tribes of external powers
such as the power to treat with other nations, and to freely convey their lands. Tribes retained their
internal powers after "conquest." However, these internal powers may be, and at times have been,
severely limited. The federal government has plenary power over Indians; as a result treaties and
congressional legislation may qualify or abrogate tribal powers, and even tribal sovereignty. See,
e.g., the Major Crimes Act of 1885, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S.
553, 565-66 (1903); and H.Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1953), which led to the termination
of 109 tribes between 1945-61.
30. The Court stated that:
[tihe Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of [a state] can have no force,
and which the citizens of [a state] have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution
and laws, vested in the government of the United States.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
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ter's progeny has, almost without exception, upheld this notion of exclusion of state power within an Indian reservation. 3
The doctrine of tribal sovereignty has not remained static since Worcester. The recognition of the sovereign status of tribes has not been a total
bar to exercises of state authority. States may, in certain circumstances,
have legitimate interests in regulating some activities within Indian country.32 In such cases, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty does not definitively
resolve the question of jurisdiction in favor of tribes. Instead, it "provides
a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and statutes must be
read. ,33
This "backdrop" analysis is often used in conjunction with the doctrine
of federal preemption of state law within Indian country. Recent U.S.
Supreme Court cases indicate an increasing reliance on preemption as a

means of protecting tribal sovereignty.' States may be expressly preempted
by legislation, or may be preempted when an exercise of state authority

within Indian country "infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them." 35
31. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) [White Mountain];
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) [Bryan]; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S.164 (1973) [McClanahan]; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) [Williams]; and Blue
Jacket v. Board of Comm'ers of Johnson County ("The Kansas Indians"), 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 737
(1866). McClanahan and White Mountain both present the caveat that state exclusion is not complete.
Since Worcester, the state exclusion doctrine has undergone some revision. E.g., states have occasionally been able to assert their legitimate regulatory interests over non-Indians on the reservation
when the rights of Indians are not involved and tribal self-government is not impaired. See, e.g.,
discussions in White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 142-44, and McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171. However,
the Supreme Court has also allowed states to assert regulatory power even when it may impact on
Indian rights of self-government. See, e.g., Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) [Rice] and Moe
v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) [Moe].
Rice allowed California to assert authority over federal Indian trader liquor licensing; Moe allowed
Washington to impose state cigarette taxes on on-reservation sales by Indians to nonmembers. The
Indian seller had to assess and collect the tax, which placed an administrative burden on him that
the state could not normally have required.
32. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171. Indians within Indian country are never subject to state
regulation, even in those states which were delegated or have assumed civil and criminal authority
pursuant to Public Law 280. 25 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982) and 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1982). See
Bryan, 426 U.S. at 384, 390.
33. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.
34. See, e.g., Rice, 463 U.S. at 718, White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 143, McClanahan, 411 U.S,
at 172 (this was the first case to actually use the word "preemption" in the context of Indian law);
Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 690-91 (1959).
Preemption is a federal doctrine which provides that state laws have no force when 1)the federal
government has acted in a particular area so as to "occupy the field," thus leaving no room for state
law to act; 2) state laws and federal laws are in conflict so that it is impossible to comply with both;
or 3) Congress expressly denied state authority in its legislation. See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Electric
v. State Energy Resources Conservation Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
Preemption in Indian law is somewhat different. No express congressional statements are required
for a court to find that state law has been preempted. Instead, "[tihe tradition of Indian sovereignty
over the reservation and tribal members must inform the determination whether the exercise of state
authority has been preempted by the operation of federal law." White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 14344 (citations omitted).
35. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
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However, states are not necessarily completely preempted from acting
within Indian country. The Supreme Court has recognized that a state
may have legitimate regulatory interests which justify assertion of authority over non-Indian activities within the reservation.36 For example,
in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,7 Justice Marshall, writing
for the Court in a six-to-three opinion, developed a "balancing test" to
use in such cases. This test "call[s] for a particularized inquiry into the
nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed
to determine whether, in the specific
context, the exercise of state authority
3
would violate federal law." 8
The Supreme Court's most recent articulation of the balancing test was
given in Californiav. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.39 In the absence
of express congressional preemption:

isitate jurisdiction is preempted ... if it interferes ... with federal
and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests
at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. [New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333-34 (1983)].
The inquiry is to proceed in light of traditional notions of Indian
sovereignty and the congressional goal of self-government, including
its 'overriding goal' of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development. Id. at 334-35. 0
The Federal Trust Responsibility
Concomitant with the tenet of tribal sovereignty is the trust responsibility imposed on the federal government. The trust responsibility arose
from the long history of federal-tribal relations, in which the federal
government offered tribes its protection, through treaties and statutes, in
exchange for Indian lands. 4' The trust responsibility requires that the
United States, as fiduciary, act in the best interest of the beneficiary tribes
to promote tribal self-government and to protect tribal lands and sovereignty.42 Historically, the trust responsibility has been used to prohibit
36. Environmental protection is an exercise of a state's regulatory authority. Therefore, the White
Mountain decision could have important ramifications in environmental law since many resource
developers on Indian reservations are non-Indians. See Will, supra note 2, at 502.
37. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
38. Id. at 145. However, Washington did not advance any regulatory interests
reputed to be at
stake in this
case. Therefore, the court did not have to perform this
balancing test.
39. - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1083 (1987).
40. Id. at..., 107 S.Ct at 1092.
41. For an excellent treatment of the federal trust responsibility toward Indians, see Chambers,
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213 (1975)
[Chambers].
42. The origin of the trust responsibility is found in the "Cherokee cases"--Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) t (183t) and Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515. For cases further defining
the trust responsibility, see e.g., Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528
F.2d 370, 379-80 (lst Cir. 1975); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F.Supp.
252, 256 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095, cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1974);
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the exercise of state jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands in order
to protect tribal sovereignty.

3

The Canons of Statutory Construction

The common law canons of statutory construction of Indian law are
another means used to protect tribal sovereignty. Four canons have developed over the past century and a half for use in interpreting treaties
and statutes affecting Indians. These canons work to counteract the historically unequal bargaining position of Indian tribes vis-a-vis the United
States government. They provide first, that courts must construe Indian
treaties and statutes liberally in favor of the Indians.' Second, courts
must resolve any ambiguities in treaties and statutes in favor of the
Indians. 5 Third, courts must construe treaties as the Indians would have
understood them . 6 Finally, an abrogation of tribal sovereignty or Indian
rights generally requires a clear expression of congressional intent. 7

Therefore, states may not assert jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country
unless Congress clearly delegates jurisdiction to the state, or unless an
act's legislative history makes such an intent clear. 8
ANALYSIS
The court in State of Washington, Department of Ecology v. United
States EnvironmentalProtectionAgency performed a two-tier analysis of
the jurisdictional issue. The first tier involved a determination that the
EPA had the authority to interpret the RCRA; the second involved a
determination that the EPA's interpretation was reasonable.
First, the court determined that the EPA had authority to interpret the
RCRA in a reasonable manner. Relying on a solid line of precedent dating
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942); and United States v, Creek Nation,
295 U.S. 103, 109-10. reh'g denied, 295 U.S. 769 (1935). See generally, COHEN, supra note 1, at
220-28.
43. See, e.g., McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164, Williams, 358 U.S. 217, and Worcester, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515. Although the exclusion of state power in Indian country has relaxed somewhat since the
absolute prohibition laid down in Worcester, the general rule of exclusion is still viable. Today,
federal preemption of state law acts in conjunction with the trust responsibility to protect tribal
sovereignty by generally prohibiting state exercises of power within Indian country. See also Chambers, supra note 41, at 1219-20.
44. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Choate v. Trapp,
224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
45. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564, 576-77 (1908).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. II 1, 116 (1938); Worcester, 31 U.S.
at 582.
47. See, e.g., Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323; Bryan. 426 U.S. at 381.
48. However, state jurisdiction over non-Indians on tribal land may be allowed. See e.g., Rice,
463 U.S. 713, White Mountain, 448 U.S. 136, Moe, 425 U.S. 463, and Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 151 (1980).
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from 1921,49 the court held that the EPA, as the RCRA's administering
agency, could interpret the Act in any reasonable manner. 5 Thus, the
court was on firm ground in deferring to the EPA's authority to decide
the extent of state power over Indian lands under the RCRA.
Once the court determined that the EPA had authority to "fill in the
gaps," it was necessary to decide whether the agency exercised this
authority reasonably. Because of the well-developed "deference to agency
interpretation" tests' the Ninth Circuit did not have to determine whether
the EPA could have made any other reasonable interpretation. The court
had only to view the agency's action in light of the EPA's own Indian
policy and the body of federal Indian law.
In determining that the EPA's interpretation was reasonable, the court
relied on federal Indian law which has developed in the 150 years since
Worcester v. Georgia. Although the development of Indian law has been
by no means a smooth path,52 the broad general outlines of tribal sovereignty, federal plenary power, and the exclusion of state power have
remained relatively constant. The court did not deviate from these general
principles, nor should it have, given the extensive reliance courts have
placed on them. 3
In interpreting the RCRA, the Ninth Circuit followed the principle of
state exclusion from Indian lands in the absence of an express congressional delegation. The RCRA definitional provisions incorporate tribes
under the definition of "person."'54 It may be argued, of course, that these
49. See supra notes 24-27. The Supreme Court in Chevron cited case law dating back to McLaren
v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477 (1921). The Ninth Circuit in Columbia Basin cited case law dating back
to Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
50. 752 F.2d at 1469.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27 and 29.
52. Federal Indian law has undergone several distinct periods, each with its own policy goals for
treatment of Indian tribes. Each period is usually diametrically opposed to both its predecessor and
its successor, creating confusion and, often, disastrous results for tribes and Indian peoples. Briefly,
these periods are:
I) 1820-50-Removal of tribes from populated to unpopulated, and usually undesirable, areas.
2) 1850-80s--Movement of tribes to established, "permanent" reservations. This
period was accompanied by extensive treaty making.
3) 1871-1928-Allotment and assimilation, during which time reservation land was
changed from communally to individually held, with the aim of making Indians into
farmers and "mainstream" Americans. The result was the diminishment of tribal land
holdings from 138 million acres to 48 million acres, almost half of which was arid or
semi-arid.
4) 1928-43-Indian Reorganization Act and preservation of the tribes.
5) 1943-61-Tribal termination. This policy ended federal recognition and the federal relationship between 109 tribes and bands and the United States.
6) 1961-present-Tribal self-determination.
See generally. COHM supra note I, ch. 2.
53. See supra notes, §11.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
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provisions are a delegation of authority to the states. However, the court
determined that the provisions are ambiguous since the question to be
resolved was whether the language of the provisions constituted an express
delegation of jurisdiction to the states. The court stated that these provisions:
S.. indicat[e] only that tribes are regulated entities under RCRA...
[and do] not say whether states have authority to enforce state hazardous waste regulations against tribes or individual Indians on Indian
lands. The legislative history of RCRA is totally silent on the issue
of state regulatory jurisdiction on the reservations."

This determination that the statute is ambiguous reflects the strict standard
which must be met in order to show that Congress intended to delegate
jurisdiction over Indian country to the states, a question examined repeatedly since Worcester.
Once the court found the RCRA provisions ambiguous, the canons of
statutory construction required that the ambiguities be resolved in favor
of the tribe.56 In this case, that meant that the RCRA's definitional provisions must be read as not granting states jurisdiction over Indian lands
for environmental protection.
In addition to resolving ambiguities in favor of the tribes, the court
viewed the RCRA against the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty as described by the Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission." As discussed above in White MountainApache Tribe v. Bracker,
courts may balance a state's regulatory interests against the tribe's interests in self-government.5 Unless the state advances significant regulatory
interests to justify its assertions of authority, the "backdrop" of tribal
sovereignty will tip the scales toward tribal, not state, authority for onreservation activities.59 Since Washington did not present any regulatory
interests which would be impaired," the court found that the EPA's
55.
56.
57.
58.

752 F.2d at 1469.
See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-40.

59. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 150.

60. Washington might have been able to assert a legitimate state regulatory interest given the fact
that pollution is transitory. Uncontrolled emissions from an Indian reservation could well jeopardize
astate's ability to comply with the federal requirements specified in this, and all other, environmental
protection statutes. Whether such an interest would be deemed to outweigh the tribe's interest in
self-government is questionable since the court stated
(wje recognize the vital interest of the State of Washington in effective hazardous
waste management throughout the state, including on Indian lands. The absence of
state enforcement power over reservation Indians, however, does not leave a vacuum
in which hazardous wastes go unregulated. EPA remains responsiblefor ensuring that

the federal standards are met on the reservations.
752 F.2d at 1472 (emphasis added).
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decision to prohibit state jurisdiction was reasonable. 6 '
Besides resolving the RCRA's ambiguities in favor of the tribe, the
court also adhered to the requirement of express congressional intent to

grant a state jurisdiction over Indian country.62 The court found that the
RCRA does not present a clear expression of congressional intent to

abrogate Indian rights in favor of state jurisdiction. Absent this expression,
allowing a state to assert jurisdiction would be a violation of the duties
imposed by the federal trust responsibility to protect tribal lands and tribal

sovereignty and to promote tribal self-determination.63
The court's determination that the EPA's decision was reasonable was
further buttressed by its reliance on two federal Indian policies promul-

gated by the EPA and the Reagan administration. The EPA's policy at
the time of Washington was to "promote an enhanced role for tribal

government in relevant decisionmaking and implementation of Federal
environmental programs on the reservations.

"'

Reagan administration

policy, then and now, promotes tribal self-determination in general.65

61. Significantly, the Ninth Circuit did not follow a recent Supreme Court case which, if read
literally, would limit tribal sovereignty to those areas in which the tribe has historically exercised
its authority. Rice, 463 U.S. 713, allowed California to impose its liquor license restrictions on a
federally licensed Indian trader selling liquor on the reservation. Justice O'Connor wrote that the
"backdrop" of tribal sovereignty comes into play only in those areas where the tribe has a "tradition ... of self-govemance." Id. at 720 (emphasis added). Such an interpretation of the backdrop
of tribal sovereignty could significantly limit the extent of a tribe's power to manage its internal
affairs. Since many issues now facing tribal governments are relatively new there can be no tradition
of self-government; a narrow reading of Rice could effectively foreclose a tribe from exercising its
full powers over issues which it literally could not have dealt with previously. In Washington, a
narrow reading could have given Washington power to assert authority over Indian country within
the state since few tribes have ever implemented and overseen environmental protection programs,
and could not, therefore, have a tradition of self-governance in this area.
Perhaps Rice will be limited to its facts. Certainly the dissenting justices, Blackmun, Brennan,
and Marshall, felt that it should be. In their dissent, they rejected the Court's "tradition of selfgovernance" holding, saying that
[t]he Court's analysis has never turned on whether the particular area being regulated
is one traditionally within the tribe's control ....
[lI]n Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, . . . (1973), the Court concluded that a State could not impose
a use tax on personalty installed in ski lifts at a tribal resort, yet it could scarcely be
argued that the construction of ski resorts is a matter with which Indian tribes historically
have been concerned.
463 U.S. at 739 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, emphasis in original).
The most recent Supreme Court opinion dealing with state regulatory authority over Indian reservations seems to limit Rice to its facts. See Cabazon, U.S. at -,
107 S.Ct. at 1094.
62. See supra note 47.
63. See generally CoHEN, supra note I, ch. 3, at § C2, and Chambers, supra note 41, at 121921.
64. 752 F.2d at 1471 (quoting EPA Policy for Program Implementation on Indian Lands, Dec.
19, 1980, at 5).See also EPA Office of Federal Activities, Administration of Environmental Programs
on Indian Lands 83 (1983). See infra, text accompanying notes 71-74 for a discussion of the current
EPA policy.
65. See President's Statement on Indian Policy, WEEKLY COMP. oF PRES. Doc., 96 (Jan. 24,
1983).
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The EPA's decision to prohibit state jurisdiction over Indian lands was
consonant with these policies. Had the EPA ruled in favor of Washington's
plan, the result would have been an impermissible extension of state
regulatory jurisdiction over Indian country. Such a result would be contrary to the principle of self-determination which is met by allowing tribal
control of tribal lands. Thus, it was logical for the court to determine
that the EPA interpretation was reasonable.
Finally, the 1981 case of Nance v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency'
provided further precedent for the Ninth Circuit. Nance upheld a provision
of the Clean Air Act67 which delegates authority to Indian tribes to redesignate their airsheds as either Class I or Class III (designations which
allow only certain degrees of air pollution). The portion of the Clean Air
Act at issue was section 7474(c) of the "Prevention of Significant Deterioration" (PSD) provisions." The EPA allowed the Northern Cheyenne
tribe to redesignate its reservation airshed from Class II to Class I, a
stricter standard which allows no deterioration of ambient air quality.
Various local coal developers protested, asserting that the delegation was
unconstitutional because the Clean Air Act allows delegation of authority
to states only.69 The Nance court affirmed the delegation to the tribes
based on the principles of inherent tribal sovereignty and deference to an
agency interpretation of an act it must administer. The court held that in
the area of air quality management "the states and Indian tribes occupying
federal reservations stand on substantially equal footing. "7
While Nance helped pave the way for Washington, the court in Nance
resolved a much narrower issue. Nance dealt with a single provision of
the Clean Air Act which presented the court with an express congressional
delegation of authority to the tribes, thus leaving no ambiguity in the
PSD provisions. Washington dealt with the question of whether the state
66. 645 F2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom, Crow Tribe of Indians, Montana v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981).
67. 42 U.S.C. §7401-7642 (1982).
68. The Prevention of Significant Deterioration provisions were added to the Clean Air Act in
1977 to deal with complaints that the Act did not provide for retention of air quality in those areas
which met or bettered the minimum standards which the Act required. All areas of the country were
designated as Class II. States, and Indian tribes, could redesignate these areas to allow for some
degradation of air quality (Class III), or to allow for no future significant deterioration of air quality
(Class 1). 42 U.S.C. § 7474 (1982).
69. The coal developers were worried that higher standards on the Crow reservation would affect

their ability to extract coal by strip mining. Strip mining creates "fugitive emissions," i.e., pollutant
emissions which escape from a source, spread over a large area, and could impact on the adjoining
areas' ability to maintain compliance with federal emissions standards imposed by the Clean Air
Act. Nance, 645 F.2d at 706-07.
70. 645 F2d at 714. Since the Nance court was deciding tribal authority to implement environmental protection programs only over a single section of the Clean Air Act which contained an
express delegation, it is safe to say that the question before the Washington court, dealing with
Indian authority over an entire act which lacked an express delegation, was one of first impression.
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could implement the entire RCRA on the reservation. Moreover, the
RCRA lacks the express delegation, either to a tribe or a state, which
was present in Nance. Therefore, the court in Washington was required
to analyze the general principles of federal Indian law and, in light of
these principles, the reasonableness of the agency action in the absence
of the express delegation. The Nance court was able to avoid the extensive
analyses required in Washington. Because of this more in-depth treatment
of the issue of authority over environmental protection programs,
Washington's precedential value is much greater than Nance's. This precedential value is enhanced by subsequent congressional and executive
treatment of this issue."
NEW EPA INDIAN POLICY PROMULGATED DURING
THE PENDENCY OF WASHINGTON
On November 8, 1984, the EPA released a new policy statement regarding environmental program administration on Indian reservations.7 2
Its purpose is to "consolidate and expand on existing EPA Indian Policy
statements in a manner consistent with the overall Federal position in
support of Tribal 'self-government' and 'government-to-government' relations between Federal and Tribal governments ...[and to] significantly
enhance environmental quality on reservation lands."" The policy described nine principles which the EPA would pursue to reach these goals:
1. The Agency stands ready to work directly with Indian Tribal
Governments on a one-to-one basis (the 'government-to-government' relationship) rather than as subdivisions of other Governments....
2. The Agency will recognize Tribal Governments as the primary
parties for setting standards, making environmental policy decisions and managing programs for reservations, consistent with
Agency standards and regulations....
3. The Agency will take affirmative steps to encourage and assist
Tribes in assuming regulatory and program management responsibilities for reservation lands....
Until Tribal Governments are willing and able to assume full
responsibility for delegable programs, the Agency will retain responsibility for managing programs on reservations....
4. The Agency will take appropriate steps to remove existing legal
71. See infra text accompanying notes 72-89.
72. EPA Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations, Nov.
8, 1984. EPA released the new policy during the pendency of Washington. However, since oral
argument for Washington was on Sept. 6, 1984, the Ninth Circuit could not, of course, use the new
policy in its decision.

73. Id. at 1.
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and procedural impediments to working directly and effectively
with Tribal Governments on reservation programs....
5. The Agency, in keeping with the Federal Trust Responsibility,
will assure that Tribal concerns and interests are considered whenever EPA's actions and/or decisions may affect Tribal environments....

6. The Agency will encourage cooperation between Tribal, State,
and Local Governments to resolve environmental problems of
mutual concern....
7. The Agency will work with other Federal agencies which have
responsibilities on Indian reservations to enlist their interest and
support in cooperative efforts to help Tribes assume environmental
program responsibilities for reservations....
8. The Agency will strive to assure compliance with environmental
statutes and regulations on Indian reservations....
9. The Agency will incorporate these Indian policy goals into its
planning and management activities, including its budget, operating guidance, legislative initiatives, management accountability
system and ongoing policy and regulation development processes ..... 74
This new policy bolsters the holding in Washington. The policy could
have effectively negated a contrary holding by the court, and stripped it
of precedential value. The new policy also forecloses further litigation
on the question of jurisdiction over environmental programs on Indian
reservations, because an official federal policy is now in effect.
RECENT STATUTORY CHANGES IN SOME
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES SINCE WASHINGTON
Since the decision in State of Washington, Department of Ecology v.
United States EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, the 99th and 100th Congresses amended several environmental statutes which were up for reauthorization. The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 75 the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (Superfund), 76
and the Clean Water Act (CWA), 77 have all been amended to provide that
the EPA administrator may, at his discretion, treat Indian tribes as states
for the purposes of the acts. 78
Both the SDWA and Superfund were passed by Congress and signed
74. id. at 2-4.
75. Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 665, codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1986).
76. Superfund Amendments and Authorization Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613,
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657 (1986).
77. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511376 (1987).

78. See infra text accompanying notes 82-87.
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into law by President Reagan, despite earlier veto threats. 79 The CWA,
after passage by the 99th Congress, was pocket vetoed by President
Reagan on November 6, 1986.8o The amendments were resubmitted and
passed by the 100th Congress in January, 1987, actively vetoed on January
29th, and finally became law after Congress overwhelmingly overrode
the veto on February 3 and 4, 1987."'
The amendments to the SDWA and the CWA are virtually identical
regarding the EPA administrator's discretion to treat Indian tribes substantially as states. He may do so when he finds that the tribe may
reasonably be expected to be capable of carrying out a federal protection
program. 2 Each act has added a new section detailing this process. 3
Section 1451 of the SDWA amendments provides that:
The [EPA] Administrator shall ... promulgate final regulations
specifying those provisions of this title for which it is appropriate to
treat Indian tribes as states. Such treatment shall be authorized only
if:
(A) the Indian tribe is recognized by the Secretary of the Interior and has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties and powers;
(B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian Tribe are within
the area of the Tribal Government's jurisdiction, and;
(C) the Indian Tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in
the Administrator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be
exercised in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of
this title and of all applicable regulations."
The Superfund amendments do not require such a finding by the Administrator. This is because the Superfund is not a protection program
like the SDWA and the CWA, but rather a clean-up program. The states
do not develop and implement plans under the Superfund. Instead, the
Act provides for various clean-up procedures, including 1) notifying a
state when releases of hazardous substances are threatened or have occurred; 2) choosing the types of remedies to be employed in treating the
release; 3) defining the roles and responsibilities of the government and
any liable parties under the national contingency plan; and 4) general
information access.85
79. SDWA, Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 642, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1986), was
passed June 19, 1986. Superfund, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§9601-9657 (1986), was passed Oct. 17, 1986.
80. CONGRESSIONAL INDEX, 99th Congress, vol. 1, S 1117 (1985-86).
81. CONGRESSIONAL INDEX, 100th Congress, vol. 2, H348 (1987-88).
82. SDWA, Pub. L. No. 99-339, § 302, 100 Stat. 642, codified at 42 U.S.C. §300j-li (1986);
CWA, Pub. L. No. 100-04, §506, 101 Stat. 7, 76-77, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (1987).

83. For purposes of this discussion, only the SDWA provisions will be quoted. The CWA provisions, found at new § 518(e) are virtually identical.
84. SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-I 1 (1986).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§9603-9607 (1982).
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Under the new Superfund amendments, tribes "will be afforded substantially the same treatment as a State with respect to [the above] proone
visions."'86 This treatment does not include allowing tribes to include
87
do.
states
the
as
clean-up
for
liast
priority
national
the
on
facility
The SDWA and the CWA amendments also provide that tribes may
receive grant and contract assistance to carry out the new duties which
may be delegated to them. 8 Lack of funding has been one of the crucial
reasons that tribes have not previously overseen environmental protection
programs on reservation lands. Since tribes were not deemed states under
prior environmental legislation, funding provisions were not readily available. When combined with the fact that many tribes have limited financial
resources, the lack of federal funding effectively barred tribes from carrying out costly environmental protection programs. 9
Many tribes own valuable natural resources which they lease as a means
of generating revenue and employment. Severe environmental problems
may be associated with resource development such as coal mining, oil
and gas extraction, and nuclear and coal-fired electric generating plants
presently occurring on some Indian reservations. Tribes are also trying
to combat unemployment problems by seeking out other means of economic development. For example, the Navajo Nation recently held an
''economic summit" to devise ways to attract other types of industry to
the reservation.'
Treatment as states will place new responsibilities on tribal shoulders.
These new responsibilities will require the tribes to learn to balance the
need for the revenues generated by these activities against the need to
preserve their equally precious natural resources.
CONCLUSION
The new EPA Indian policy effectuates the Washington holding that
states lack jurisdiction to implement environmental protection plans under
the RCRA, and by analogy, similarly unclear statutes. Relitigation of the
issue in Washington is now unnecessary. The new provisions of the SDWA,
Superfund, and the CWA also foreclose litigation of the jurisdiction issue
for these acts.
Undoubtedly, there will be litigation over a tribe's ability to assume
enforcement power, and over the quality of its actual enforcement. However, the extension of state authority over Indian country is effectively
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 126, 100 Stat. 1706.
Id.
SDWA, 42 US.C. § 300j-1 1(3), CWA,Pub, L. No. 100-04, § 518(c) and (f), 101 Stat. 78.
Will, supra note 2,at 500-501.
Albuquerque Journal, July 27, 1987, at Al.
42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 (1982).
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barred, at least for these newly amended statutes allowing delegation to
the tribes.
Presumably, other statutes such as the Clean Air Act, 9 the Noise Pollution Control Act, 92 and the RCRA will be amended to conform with
the SDWA, Superfund, and the CWA when they are reauthorized. In the
interim, Washington offers sound guidance for courts which may be faced
with the jurisdiction issue.
The Ninth Circuit was confronted in Washington with an issue which
has only recently become an important issue in federal Indian lawenvironmental regulation. The court correctly identified the principles
needed to resolve it, and accurately applied and interpreted them. The
general principles of Indian law, the EPA's assessment of the issue, and
the federal policies promoting tribal self-determination used by the court
could not logically or consistently have led to any other conclusion.
CATHERINE E. POPE

92. 42 U.S.C. §§4901-18 (1982).

